

1983

1990, we Oct 25, 2015

(?) PRIAB REPORT ON 1983 WAR SCARE? Oct. 6, 2015

If (SU) see us as we really are doing

If interpret this — somewhat wrongly (more opposing)
— as we would.

If respond (mostly) as we would.

We respond to see their behavior as

responding to us (at all)

5/1
We really are very like
us — as we really
are (currently)

or seeing us (as we are,
not as we imagine
us to be (& be doing)

If we mirrored our
real selves — we would
provide the better!

or responding as we would

(not
OR: acting from fear [or damp pol?
really acts...]

Partly because "we" — public, intell, most of few
don't know what we are doing

(currently — or perceive

their public actions as

others do

(~~know~~, behaving in privacy
of our motives, intentions,
behavior — "we wouldn't

do that — esp., for such

to us: "controlled" 6/15

hidden history — or, force done / or how we
perceive

b-14

Should analysts ever be confronted¹¹
of others' intentions, perceptions

(What if others' not worst-case estimate
of our intentions?)

But SU behind the wall here, most
realistic

Initial reference compares to (leads to)
2) what leaders want to believe

b) " " do believe

as are open to believing

(1983 - American didn't want to believe...)

A) Supposed "Delicate Balance" period

1958-60 (AWW)

If we were
recognized -
no delivery.

Really dangerous - ^{recognized here} delicate (TCS, AWW)

But never existed - then or since.

(US FB, yes if you agree)

minus, if sure cos. (B) "Parity"? Inherent. What natural: both had
recognized. large (whether equal or not) survivable retal force.

If "real requirements
for defense"

— (BUT) does your criterion apply if nation forces (ultimately
to attack) of being hit first, with deserving attack

— P. status of 1-10 warheads against: ^{long} FU, or conventional attack
or primitive war. BUT...

year?

non-R Warsaw Pact missile order.

(like Wallace
Waters)

WHY
NOW?
crisis

R "empire" now at leaders of ^(east) Ukraine

~ Colts
Mogor = West Berlin

B has existed since 1964-68

(though supposedly SU agreed to change

and US did act as if it could change

yet each has acted as if A now existed!

With some reality (which should not make

land-based

ICBMs

C³ - decap.

a difference - toward A - but probably would,

in crisis: [e.g. US + R actually shooting]

never happened, except 1952, Korea

Oct 27, '62 + Nov. 2

NOW: Turkey

Indonesia
Arabs

12-6-15

3

NC Rather willing to remove/replace/transfer A
to true stability

(e.g. 2 mics with SLBMs,
no ASW) (or ABM)

c.e. miss "security" for either
from mics > 0

Wf not? 2) Service/MIC interest in CCBMs
Cong.

(b) desire to maintain threat of
RU/FS w/ "empire" - vs. large conventional
or terror attack

"threat of instability:

attack based on fear P.C.

(not contents of organs
attack)

"Don't wake us from loss of attack"

Don't start, see, alert,

mobilize (Harris to Spence,
Aug 1914)

Spence to Harris

("don't let Britain

attack Germany")

TR

[Harris did - "let's
now turn back."

AND IT WAS!

BOT...

(How over, butler: DISASTER

12-6-15

4

b. 15 Was SU still married, in May, June 1984

after Able Green? Wf?

X Did SU reconcile (pros)?

12-16-15
5

Did US miscalculate in Sept. '61 or after.

1) SU interest in FS cap.?

After 1964-65:

1) Tactical warning too late

SU registered in '83;

2) no quick response unlike or
missing

SU propaganda

3) Both, it's known

"World Peace Coming"

K
SU & G were right.

3) Start warning does not make

"prompt start" approp. nothing

HK: "K is first trying to get us
next to threaten or prepare for TN

does, including the warning (correct
or
false)

| was, or start it. "YES".

RICKLEY:

prompt start is not an approp.

Parents wanted children die

(Survivors will end the deal): K vs. HK

or less than disaster

RACISM

(Dangerous evaluation, belief. (like "Blacks are dangerous")

50M deal (+ loss,

"few are dangerous")

destruction of hospitals,
transport.

is much better than

100-150M deal. A+B counts;

communication

indicates

again also

"worth taking an added risk - of foreign industrial -
risk - of TN war? (as well as cost cost)

A-count
"only"

HK

SAC

12-6-15

B.

[Why and SU start Dead Hand?

With PD-59 (when launched?)

Center, Bg. ? direct.

as with Reagan

dates?

1770km 1100 miles P-II (starts with

direct-launch 1977 (Center)

?
100 ft CEP
30m

Center, Perry!
= DE!

(SS-20 deployed 1976 (begin)

USSR
(cancel ~~Perry~~)

After Order
1983

eastern US, Belarus
Kithman (Kithman)

recognized by
Congress as forward,
from 84

SDI: (when?)

Also, NATO response
to USSR

CM bullet

Congress from 84: "political blustering"?

Was this propaganda?

What is the us as doing?

(assumed SU understood
it so much?

"If we will we see
is the minor-bluffs?"

Oct 83: 500K protest

in Bonn (me?)

Muthlanger, from Even 83

[Sept. 1 - 1983]

When "we" (WH) ^{intell} wants to see "them" as aggressive (never - "genuinely blinded"

X to do. But he didn't in 1988 - ^{with reason} that went against "we" ^{generally} from "political blindness" /

WHD is busy (Intell sees & reports what (the person) WH SU - '83 wants them to see & report * ("or else")

(Bourbonnais? What did SU ^{critically to} (esp. after WH had responded (or ignored) Intell present?) the first pass, which is what intell only has intell needs (Ritzsche: conscience)

* Continuing * reconstructions, intell (knowing, org - wise) will always do this.

p. 17 Did SU confront UK with this from? or, US allies?

(Mortimer informed of the failure to do this.)

[Because they wanted to prevent?! Mod:]

C-II (But) see VER - examples in 1962?! But VER planned only blockade, not attack, or were attacked

A 17 Was there down of SU function in 1984, after
Abel arch?

RY₂N still on.

Wk did Anderson ^{Brother} Chambers?

Byron - dis 11? Nov 1982

Is King?

Anderson: ^{Rank} 12 Nov 82 ^{83:} - 9 Feb 84 (69)

Chambers KGB: 18 Aug 67 - 26 May 82 RY₂N
Chambers Residence 16 Jan 83 - 9 Feb 84

(Don Hod...)

13 Jan 84 - 10 March 85

(Hammer)

RY₂N?

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10

p. 17 SU "violates" interpreted as ^{SU} Madness
for intimidation,
NOT prompt (word)
as response to US attack

= C-II:

Cong was (alone) more struck by SU moves (~84)
like McCon in '62. Both right!

Still say that SU seems R. Behn as more hostile

(Wait for Hillman
to jump!)

but thought they wanted to
influence re. election — not, prompt

[OBL would GWB in 2004!]

X [Prompt should be off the table for US & SU
since 1965 — 50 years ago
But is central for both!]

[R can see a more hostile — & building up —
not aggressive — US coming in 2017!
(Like Thomas looking at Russia 1917, for
1914:)]

OK ok!

19. NIE also were "high confidence"

A-20 ^{of itell} Greater to be "Categorized" + "unclassified"
(to be altered to, influential, "crabber")

Handling defects Aug 1985

from 1981 (RY2N). R

22. For US would want to pass "unach leaving
is a crisis"

(control with leaving)

FS doing exposed, outside crisis [WRONG:]

Did we pass
this this from
SU?

Asymmetry?)

23. For cheap from P II's.

12
12:30 PM

TR: "Since BHO is a Muslim, he can't
say anything."

TA felt morally obligated to say something

(pres were < 1% of American pop.
Muslims were < 1% of

Was serious

> 50% (60%) of Repubs believe Muslim

BHO "not born in US" = Muslim

"What does it mean

Cruz "We'll bend the ^{constitution} (15/51) into oblivion..."

TR

12-6-15

13

12PM

PD-59 is a return to my FS study
plan @ drop!

Moscow - to get new states to de-kill (?)

It is possible to take initiative
+ more effort

(Nov. - '86 withdraws Tanks NOD
~ Bush is 91

Went

see Kaplan - the unit back to y plan

Center PD-59

R is talking of unimpaired nuclear war

64WB "priming"

PD-59 now

UC since 1984 & say, R is only using
public who was private planning

Not just talk - it was the basis of
one planning - in
Ent Empire

p. 23 "Amir 1980" PD-59 Center/Ry (Peng?)
no?
universal danger of war

p. 23 15

Mr Butler?

Butler: 16 of SAC Aug 84

Aug 86 Dep Dir Ops

Dir from 87

Aug 87 Univ dir plus J-5

Aug 89 Dir.

from 91 sent CINCPAC

- June 92

Street Comm. ...

2C VRY2N - Was Horns

Both sides act as if

[What if US writes off (or even fulfills) of SU
to write off) damage to US from SU missiles

(like Riga CPD in SU!) "SU writes off damage not from ICBMs

like damage to Europe from SU MRBMs in 1961-62

or " " SS-20s in 1981-83!

China does
not!

vs. DE!

K in 60-62
did not!

Each side acts as if threat from ICBMs of each
is of transcendent importance! (y. blow?)

— as if = highly important (at cost of deployment,
and at cost of ~~accuracy~~ ^{miss} accuracy, probed, resilient, instability —

to be able

— to target and destroy, quickly (as command)
all enemy ICBMs (as many as possible, even in
2nd stage LVA, LOW)
nuclear, accuracy, yield, deployment, intels, "nuclear war"
B-1

— ~~not~~ not to have its own ICBMs
(all, most) destroyed

- High alert — fast reaction
- hardening
- LVA wearing out
- mobile MX being

rather than: eliminate all — mutually
unilaterally

- now — about
- forget those wearing & desert rather, no proportion
- draw numbers from every targets:
no and for "points" or hard-target
prompt destruction
- no LOW (LVA?)

|| no destruction of more than x cities,
deliberate / collateral / accidental (misses)

KGB concern: Assassination = Putin?
 (not, Yakovlev!)

27. Did SU leaders feel to take off prop. means
 if the believe...

Did they feel?
 why?

Reason? If my believe, (degrades)
although

"D.S." (see K "believe" in US invasion of Cuba:
 yet failure to detect:
 = C-I!
 SAMs
 weapons
 troops
 too slow!

27 SU didn't trust strategic warning!

on survival of the state!

(see Pines & London
 "now")

and possible R reaction!

Why am known?
over

18

I know

LOW - Why?

→ before the war; Why?

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| 1. Vs. <u>Premature</u> | = | <u>Both sides</u> ! |
| Vs. "1st <u>stage</u> <u>later</u> <u>the</u>
2nd <u>stage</u> ." | = | out as if
believe? |
| 2. my <u>plan</u> of "detonation" | = | out in <u>crisis</u> ?
(A-bomb - det. of H)
A-bomb: " of 2.0.)
H-bomb: " of <u>race</u> |

H-bomb 1978

P-II CM 1983

(Mongolia / Ukraine (SAGAN Note 83)

(C-II) = Abel Crash

plans

Georgia (Kiev) Ukraine / Crisis - did P force
western?

↳ Mongolia

1979 - fisher bits in Gydan

SYRIA (U.S. - R beating; Turkey shoot-down

(Phuket, Qui Nhon

34A

my plan of Night Sal - SU removal of testing
but, chronology

(K tests 1961 - after Enrich; master

small factories - very
dangerous

Haps

C.I. } US know.
1983 }

(SU beliefs of MRBMS vs. Europe: ADW)

(Attempts to recognize for "serious" moves/challenges

9-11?

frag WMD? (not really)

frag resistance?

after " ?

(VN? fat a

Danger is what supports belief is opposite
that (5) 2nd!

1) "Pragmatism" is advantageous

2) we think it is advantageous

((3) we think he thinks we think...

us. China, so far.

(India, Pak, ^{FU}Israel) do believe it.

Probably not UK, France, (Germany) (Japan)

China (Israel, not an issue (NA)

US, R, India, Pak

and we are acting as if we do

and as if we believe R does

which is true for

R military (like ours?)
all?

3rd part

PAYOFF

[20, 1]

DOES PUTIN?

He might, or might not.

see (Asian leadership)
Latin Africa

NATO?

(Putin, or R not, NOW?)

September 1983

Also: "If one goes, might as well all go." (Kerry)

"If R not go - China..."

(Israel: Mossad - Plus
Lebanon

If we are to be occupied - all may (should)
die

(Castro; VCS (not R, not V-E-K) the?) (Quincy)

Admiral? (If not for: not best NATO POLAND? ICIEV? India-Pak? (to date, or referred)

What was ^{Feb} Andrews 1983-89 balance between
to Carter FS would be?
Rosen (NE SC) $\frac{80}{83}$
84

3 more chances (than; now?!) of R
attender ("dispute") than I which
possible

more "deliberate, instability"
(thanks to both sides! before 1964
(K. Lofsky, C. H.) and after
than I supposed (give SCBMS
which should

less of
as a possibility perhaps not deeper
CW inclination to challenge the other

Neither side
not "Machos" but presence of ANW-like
"rationality" (or, K. M. - like)

p. 36

Did I talk out plans in '82?
to increased pressure?

see Pipers:
Andrews did believe
(what or what
VCE did)

Report talks about Able Archer, but also a lot about
SU effort in 84;

current value

22

To describe US CA as "purveying provocations"
will be an effort to oppress/denigrate
of mis in the CA!
of to "expose" SC ~~to~~ "response"

What did follow from PHAB Report?

A.37

all recommended

{ Further studies?
collaboration?
dialogue with Seneg?

closure/character of agency? loss of influence?
new process in extracts

"risk analysis"? (I but not)

(thought of org? NO - not required)

Reval DE Paper

Did SU not want opportunity to this from?

If not, why not? (see K in C-II)

X [1990 Report ^(or 1982) is before 1992/2002 knowledge
from from SU offices on C-II!

Exert it as much!

(¹⁹⁸⁵ Monitoring deficits before Orlov, etc.)

Verbal 1989?

Dr. S - "If didn't you (SU) tell us you were
going on about - and why?" (to date, not respond)

PUBLICIZE NUC WINTER (see IC records in East Germany '59

(Gendreau understood it; and understand?)

?

Are Carter

Bz?

Plum

on PD-59... P-II...

39

Was P-II malice?

Could it be moved closer to Moscow?

W did Warsaw Pact attribute 2500 km range?

Error? or correct?

(What weather was this at?)

and was not either exposed it to Moscow
or short it?

(higher stage?)

(400 km)

Now and at "center" SS-20 (to capitals?)

at only 1400 km?

400 250 mi

1400 km — 870 mi.

2500 1553 mi

1800

1990 Report — Before break-up / the glaciers!

Before Brace Blair on David Harold

wrong: 40

capture Hoffman

the warfight both: Rnta?

(196) (WORK; (me)) Ben Cohen...

(Schlesinger? N? HAK

Carter (Stora?) By PD-59

the "Shovels" Ryan (Ball), ...
GHR

Has R give up war-fights?

NO — Not for them

displacement, demigod

Plans (US-Kill - no
longer present)

BUT if R gives

the way, US WILL

Deliberate — how present war

(perhaps on street, warning

depends on posture + ^{and} beliefs, despite

"adjusted" position

1990 Report confirms poss. of drop of SU !!

TS - Under - Name

WRONG?!

ent. w. P-II

If SU believe - poss. of drop, it could
not avoid the warning

if used here to, with

2) delegate David Hood

not mentioned as

poss. in 1990:

(b) primitive war / report on
that warning of "out-of-the
primitive war" of US

Series for 1-3 1982

+ Carter-Pace Frege

call for United Nations
(Prinkov)

Able Break

as indicator

[VS. "COVER"]

See Ontario S-II:

B dec 10 Nov 82

A dec 9 Feb 84

C dec 10 Nov 85

also half sum^{SU}, in late
months of each?

whose exportations
count?

PF/AB

p.42 As late as 1990, Russian defense line
at all aware of Dunk Kind

- ICBM "last" able to respond
- 1) quickly
(and force to!)
 - 2) to surprise attack
(low warning)

But what is "respond"? 0-8-minutes
what force?

OK - SU would warning (not force) - hours
(for hours minutes) for hours (days)
for survival of other than ICBMs
[not us!]

AO? ICBMs!
1-2 hours!

1979 - VRXAN model - see movie War Games

LAPUTA

45 "Highly vulnerable" SU depends on US machines
to accept X% prob. of Y damage! NOT on %
in SU destroyed: How much is left, relative to US cities!
"BUT: 'concrete' attack" to US
surprise attack (AUV on SU - though does he
(not) assume big US about (& small about in cities?)

(Should not a US surprise attack - not expecting (i.e. with - then)
a SU attack - have been estimated at 0 prob. (=OK, this attack)
ONLY 1525 out of 6100 wounded "overseas" (i.e. SURVIVE)

8th Brig. 1 p. 462

vs. Russ Winter

(6000 original
 > 11,000 total in '85 (Rost.)
 > 8000 alive

advent + training after attack

2100

2000 on target

(2000 vs. 8000 before attack)

1/3 of 6000 "original"

47. Late '70's, misinformation

= NOW! (Both sides)

see my framingKatrina: not Russ DassSee our expectations aboutPutin — info47. Opponent shift from MAD in late -70's: to FS'

would be public (as did GWRB) (Ns...)

what even always plan:CARTER

WHY?

CPD?

WZ CPD?

Russ Dass (Brown)TEAM B: GWRB (C/A) under Ford

Our "threatening posture" was interpreted of Soviet Feb 80
 as (not very hostile, + posturing) but prep. for surprise

attack (NO?) — ANU/RAN (me) (USAF/VCS (not the)

but in 1958-61: (+US sub physical sup.) PREEMPT (NSOP)
 no-US-RAND 58-

there was a risk of esc in '61 (1
+62

at of false alarm (too warning)

esp. during crisis

(though it did occur, and 1979, 1983

was not reported up

of "war who said
would")

but: might it have been of a real
attack (not) based on UA (D. 5) (1964)
on esc (C-II) (based on UA)

but on ~~not~~ "start information" (not too warning
of surprise attack? without: with)
substante

Could still believe - with probs begin -
the critical risk (50% for Petrov superior)
that Oth might launch surprise attack
e.g. during exercise

not during conflict (Uk.

Carson

Syria

Korea, if

VN, ~~if~~

(China?)

Hankow!

yes: same could 1984-83

("out of CW")

As this " now?"

(KGB/Bolshevik perception
of US End Empire

like Petrov (A/W) perception of K in 1954-61

(as North VN as Russian Bolshevik traditions: Dear Hunter, Ocean
VX see American Sniper

80 - N/HAR definite begins to involve under
Ford (Chen B: alt?)
 Schlesinger?

Schles: DOE (first) Aug 6, 1977 - Aug 23, 1979
 Carter RITF: agents met

Sec Def: Feb 2, 1973 - Nov 19, 75 (Ford)
 N N
 (after Elliott Richardson)
 memorial of Rockefeller)

Jan 1929

dir. memo, 20, 2014
 (85)

(Rosen die '95
 8 children

DCI: Feb 2, 1973 - Feb 2, 1973
 no trial

after Natus
 longer lobby

RAND 'C3
 -69

Ch. AEC 1971-73

PP:

after Seaborg
 before Dicks for Ray

Schles: 73-74, on MAD, for "ceramic start" (!) = DE

(lost in place)
 see 90M, IV)

= DE, DE N

balance (NO)

parity

(but it had been, & was now, impossible, messy)

(was 2nd strike: on the

later the SIOP-62

= MAD!

The last time (late 170's) SU talked of
war-fighting, the ~~wasn't~~ kidding.

(Trump? Hillary?)

[Can Sanders content/challenge Trump's
"we-~~the~~" frame?

League: effort of NATO expansion post 1990:
Kiev

51

~~PD-59~~

BMD

Kaplan

long —

PD-59 looks like "new" threatening strategy

(see below, Ford!)

My/WWE hit

emphasizing WWE

+ drags (US - convince
USAF version

("NO critics": answer?

Most serious view (≠ US critics? or? League?)
of R policy: ES (I said: cap.

threat

see my talk to first USA

but I'd respond is

more than bluff/posturing

or limitation, permit

Could it be so crazy as we were with the/RAND?
in 2015? If were, in 1983 - how not?

This is as surprising to me as designing united
in that R phase FS!

?

What would ~~to~~ ^{have} been done if he had
~~not~~ of him in charge instead of Amur?

of Chernenko ?!

(me G + R late 1985-86 !)

+ How Dec 7 1987

(after (?) INF ?)

[No mention: SU is offen all along this

(big CA by Con + Regen)

What did that USA think doing all this?

A mont, from '82 Princed

Sergei Plavinski ...

...

A false alarm during A.A → TN W

Petrov is now. no. left!

KAL-007 is now!

60

End Empire, March 8, 1983

SDI → FS

12-7-15

33.

VRVAN implies:

1) US VRVAN $\approx$ SU VRVAN

2) prob. of US FS depends on "relative strength" of US/SU

3) If US is sufficiently relatively strong $\approx$ SU suff. w. regard
US will attack (surprise) (even if it does not
expect SU attack)

[4] BUT: if the latter, ^{SU} VRVAN $\approx$ 40, US should
expect SU surprise attack! (no "crisis"
"alarm"
not showing hands for FS! as in
Nov '83

NOT JUST DETERMINING
If SU is serious about attacking early
in Abn Crisis, it would

? How much does VRVAN depend on "actual" perceptions
[and/or indicators not of perceptions / strength
either before or after being struck, but of
intent to attack ^{soon} [which Oth should work to
conceal, or delay awareness of, or make ambiguous;
or an FS/SS (research-study) ("exercise")
outcomes, evaluated (utilis) (" - as " ?)

1990 PFIAR Report

at a time when neither side "should" have considered FS under any circumstances (including being shot, certainly to be shot within minutes ...)*

X (It made no more difference / sense for Bay to tell Center in 1979 than to tell his wife or Petrov (whether center was right (no attack) or not (5 minutes

Petrov: "I don't want to be responsible for ... oniride"

(what if response "50-50" ("it is 5 minutes — would have been limited?" NOT 200")

Would US response be?

(Pg. 200)

(1995: 1 minute

EMT?
dead?)

* SU was considering launching a war resulting from SU surprise attack

[Report doesn't consider whether

SU could do surprise. If the warning of US attack unreliable, surprise is unreasonable and makes no difference. If surprise was [or was?], likely if VRXNKE

though A/W formulated opinion: LW, warning too warning

SU believe US SURPRISE ATTACK (CA) - POSSIBLE